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Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution
Calvin Massey*
A great deal has been written about the Second Amendment in the last
two decades.! The result is a body of work that illuminates the historical
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. I thank
Reuel Schiller for his historical understanding and vision, Bill Wang for his skeptical per-
spective and insightful commentary, and Don Kates for insisting that I think about the Second
Amendment Thanks also to my friends and acquaintances who read and commented upon
earlier versions of this Article. The errors and omissions are, of course, mine alone.
Given the passion that the subject of guns induces and the propensity of people to look for
hidden bias in this area of scholarship, I wish to make the following disclosures. I do not belong
to any gun advocacy group, whether for or against individual gun possession. I have attended
a seminar sponsored by Academics for the Second Amendment, which I found to be relatively
even-handed, though there were no participants who are proponents of abolition of private
possession offirearms. I have never owned nor possessed a firearm and have no intention of ever
doing so. I think the world would be a better place without firearms but that utopian state of
affairs will never exist. I am not motivated to write this Article by the desire to advance any par-
ticular ideological perspective on firearms possession.
1. A partial bibliography of the commentary includes at least the following works: GUN
CONR OLANDTHECONST£11MON: SOURCESANDEXEORATIONSONTHESEONDAMENDMENT
(Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond eds., 1994); CLAYToN CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE
OFTHEMSELVESAND THE STATE: THE ORIGiNALINTENTAND JUDICIALINTERPRETATIONOFTHE
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEARARMS (1994); STEPHENHALEROOK, FREEDMEN: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, 1776-1866 (1998); STEPHEN
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED - THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
(1984); DAVID HARDY, ORIaiNANDDEVELOPMENTOF THE SECONDAMEmENT (1986); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.. 1131 (1991); Randy E.
Barnett & Don B. Kates, Jr., Under Fire: The New Consensus on the SecondAmendment, 45
EMORY L.L 1139 (1996); Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Earb America: The Regulation
ofFirearms Ownership, 1607-1794,16 LAW & HIST. REV. 567 (1998) [hereinafter Gun Laws];
Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendment, 16 CONST.
COMM 247 (1999) [hereinafter Suicide Pact]; Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun
Culture in the UnitedStates, 1760-1865,83 J.AmL HIST. 425 (1996) [hereinafter Origins]; Carl
T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the SecondAmendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1998);
Saul Comell, Commonplace orAnachronism: The Standard Model, The SecondAmendmen4
and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COM. 221
(1999); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J.
995 (1995); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The SecondAmendment Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEo. L.J. 309 (1991); Clayton E. Cramer & David B.
Kopel, "Shall Issue'" The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV.
679 (1995); Lawrence Delbert CressAnA red Community: The Origins and Meaning of the
Right to BearArms, 71 J. AML HIST 22 (1984); Lawrence Delbert Cress & Robert E. Shalhope,
The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. AM. HIST. 587
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context in which the Second Amendment was adopted and enriches our
theoretical understanding of its meaning. The historical and the theoretical
works are divided into two camps. Some historians argue that revolutionary
America was a culture in which every able bodied, adult free man was ex-
pected to possess a firearm, ready and equipped for use, if necessary, in
defense of the community. However, that expectation was often more empty
ideal than reality.2 Other historians contend that America in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries was not characterized by anything close to
(1984); Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the SecondAmendment: Declarations by a
Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597
(1995); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the SecondAmendment, 26 VAL U. L. REV.
107 (1991); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: ConstitutionalFalse Consciousness andDereliction
of Dialogic Responsibilify, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995); Don I-Egginbotham, The Federalized
Militia Debate: A NeglectedAspect of SecondAmendment Scholarship, 55 WA & MARY Q.
39 (1998); Don Higginbotham, The Second Amendment in Historical Context, 16 CONST.
COMM. 263 (1999); Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the SecondAmendment: An IndividualRight
to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGEts L.J. 1 (1992); Don B. Kates, Jr.,
Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the SecondAmendment, 82 MICM L. REV.
204 (1983); Don B. Kates, Jr., The SecondAmendment and the Ideology ofSelf-Protection, 9
CONST. CoMM. 87 (1992); Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The
Prevalence and Nature ofSel-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995);
David B. Kopel, The SecondAmendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359
(1998); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989);
Nelson Lund, The SecondAmendmen4 Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39
ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right ofthePeople to Keep andBearArms:
The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983); Thomas B. McAffee &
Michael J. Quinlan, BringingForward the Right to Keep andBearAnns: Do Text History, or
Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781 (1997); Glenn Harlan ReynoldsA Critical
Guide to the SecondAmendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 443 (1995); Elaine Scany, War and the
Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to BearArms, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1257 (1991); RobertE. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins ofthe SecondAmendment, 69 J.AM.
HIST. 599 (1982); Robert E. Shalhope, To Keep and Bear Arms in the Early Republic, 16
CONST. COMM. 269 (1999); William Van Alstyne, The SecondAmendment and the Personal
Right toArms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace SecondAmend-
ment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998); Eugene Volokh, Rejoinder: The Amazing Vanishing
SecondAmendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 831 (1998); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism
and the Citizen Militia: The TerifyingSecondAmendment, 101 YALEL.J. 551 (1991) [herein-
after Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia]; David C. Wdliams, Response: The Unitary
SecondAmendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 822 (1998).
There has been so much written on the subject that this is merely a selective bibliography.
Apart from the legal and historical issues compressed into the Second Amendment is the
voluminous literature on gun policy and gun viorence. The merest tip of that bibliographic
iceberg is presented here: GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FmEARms AND TH CONTROL
(1997); GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOINCE IN AMERICA (1991); DAVID B.
KoPE GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THEM? (1995); JOHIN R. LOTr, JR., MoPE GUNS, LEss
CRME: UNDmSTANDING CRIvE AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (1998).
2. See, e.g., Shalhop, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, supra note
1, at 611-12 (collecting sources which discuss early republican views of leaders such as Wash-
ington and Madison on importance of armed citizens and their collective force as militia).
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universal gun ownership, even among healthy, adult free men, and that fire-
arms were prohibited to many people in this American society The theoreti-
cal divide derives from and mimics the historical cleavage. One camp of
theorists argues that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
gun ownership, relying for that conclusion on a variety of historical sources,
structural arguments, and doctrinal nuggets extracted from a very sparse lode.4
The other group, sometimes described as "militia-cenric,"5 contends that the
Second Amendment protects only a collective right to defend the community
and definitely does not include any individual right to gun ownership or to gun
possession." A relatively lonely middle ground is occupied by those, most
notably Robert Shalhope, who argue that the Second Amendment was created
to secure both an "individual right to possess arms and the right of the states
to form their own militia."7
The passions engendered by firearms possession are volcanic and occa-
sionally color clear and objective judgment. Intemperate partisans of gun
abolition have attacked individual rights theorists as dishonest tools ofthe gun
lobby.' Over-zealous champions of the individual rights point of view have
uttered such outrageous nonsense as claiming that the Second Amendment
"isn't about hunting ducks; it's about hunting politicians."9 There is, however,
a genuine debate within these polar extremes. Individual rights theorists have
marshaled an impressive array of early sources ranging across the Federalist
and Anti-Federalist divide, including localists such as St. George Tucker and
nationalists such as Joseph Story, all for the purpose of supporting their con-
tention that the founding generation was in agreement that there existed an
individual right to possess arms.10 This reading of history has come under
sharp attack from historians, who contend that it ignores the heterogeneity of
3. See, e.g., Bellesiles, Origins, supra note 1, at 425.
4. See generally Volume 42 ofthe TennesseeLawReview devoted to the Second Amend-
ment and, in particular, Reynolds, supra note 1.
5. Barnett & Kates, supra note 1, at 1204-07 (explaining "militia centric" or "narrow
individual right" principle).
6. See, e.g., Williams, Civi Republicanism and the Citizen Militia, supra note 1, at 551.
7. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, supra note 1, at 610.
8. See, e.g., Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and
Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 141 (1995) (noting that many
individual rights theorists are members of "Academics for the Second Amendment" headed by
National Rifle Association Executive Board member Joseph Olson). A detailed refutation of
Herz's charges is contained in Barnett & Kates, supra note 1, at 144-45.
9. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact, supra note 1, at 250 (quoting Linda Thompson, self pro-
claimed "Adjutant General of the Unorganized Militia of the United States").
10. This view is often referred to as the "Standard Model" because so many recent com-
mentators have signed on to this view. Indeed, its proponents presume to attach that label to
their work. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 1, at 461, 471.
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early American political culture, commits the sin of anachronism by assuming
that the framers shared our world views and that the framers' language meant
to them what it means to us, and overlooks critical aspects of how the found-
ing generation actually behaved with respect to private firearms possession. 1
Each camp has it partly right. There is a great deal of evidence suggest-
ing that the founding generation regarded firearms possession as an individual
right' 2 But that right was hardly unqualified. The historians critical of the
individual rights thesis amply demonstrate the ways in which early Americans
freely circumscribed the individual right to possess firearms in the interest of
securing what was thought to be the public good. The historical objections
to the individual rights thesis do not, however, destroy the validity of the
individual rights point of view. Firearms possession in early America gener-
ally was limited to loyal members of the civil polity, essentially the electorate
exclusive of criminals and the disloyal - those whose possession of firearms
would pose a danger to public safety and political stability."3 The fact that
early America barred large portions of the population from firearms posses-
sion - women, Indians, slaves, the propertyless - serves only to prove that the
scope of the individual right to arms was limited to those who composed the
civil polity. These historical practices may weaken the claim made by some
individual rights theorists that the Second Amendment was designed to create
an armed citizenry as a potent threat to governmental tyranny, but they fail
to establish that the founding generation did not recognize any individual
right at all. Today, when the civil polity includes virtually all the people
disenfranchised by our ancestors, the historical evidence concerning early
firearms regulation bolsters the individual rights argument more than it
undercuts it.
11. See, e.g., Bellesiles, Suicide Pact, supra note 1, at 247-50 (noting that lawyers have
turned to republicanism as "all inclusive" explanation of American history while historians are
abandoning it); Cornell, supra note 1, at 223-26 (arguing that Standard Model scholars have
ignored trend in legal community toward pluralist model of political and constitutional thought
to explain "heterogeneity of [early] American political culture"); I-igginbotham, The Second
Amendment in Historical Context, supra note 1, at 263-65 (lamenting narrow historical focus
of Standard Model of legal research); Shahope, To Keep and BearArms in the Early Republic,
supra note 1, at 270 (stating that ignorance of early American political culture and intellectual
climate has brought about "anachronistic presentation of the Second Amendment"); Bellesiles,
Gun Laws, supra note 1, at 567; Garry Wills, To Keep andBearArmsN.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept.
21, 1995, at 62 (claiming that Standard Model proponents ignore military context of historical
statements).
12. See infra notes 20-59 and accompanying text (detailing historical evidence marshaled
by individual rights theorists).
13. See infra notes 57-80 and accompanying text (discussing historical limitations on
firearms possession).
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To prove that early Americans exhibited through regulation a belief that
there was no individual right to firearms possession, it would be necessary to
show that states regulated firearms possession by those who composed the
civil polity. free, adult; propertied men. To put it another way, the fact that
Sally Hemings could not legally possess a firearm in eighteenth century
Virginia, but Thomas Jefferson could, speaks only to the exclusionary nature
of the eighteenth century polity, not to blanket negation of an individual right
to bear arms. If eighteenth century Virginia had barred Thomas Jefferson
from firearms possession, the historians' argument for proving the absence of
an individual right to bear arms would be far stronger. But that was not the
case, in Virginia or anywhere else. 4 Today, when Sally Hemings and Thomas
Jefferson are equal participants in the polity, the historical limits on Sally's
right to bear arms, like the historical limits on Sally's freedom or Sally's right
to vote, are mute testimony to the smug assumptions of class privilege of an
earlier time, but say nothing about the state's power to restrict law-abiding
members of the polity from possessing firearms.
Thus, we are left with the strong probability that the Second Amendment
protects individual firearms possession in some manner and to some degree,
but that right is subject to a great deal of regulation and limitation. 5 Though
in the first part of this Article I will briefly survey some of the historical
evidence that is amply sifted elsewhere,'6 my focus is primarily to examine the
questions that are raised by treating an individual rights theory ofthe Second
Amendment seriously. Should the Second Amendment be incorporated into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus fetter the
states? What level ofjudicial scrutiny should apply to firearms regulations?
Should there be specific triggers for heightened judicial scrutiny and, if so,
what should they be? If there should be any heightened scrutiny, how strict
should it be? Should heightened scrutiny follow the "pigeonhole" approach
of traditional equal protection, or should it embrace the flexible, "sliding-
scale" approach urged by Justices Thurgood Marshall and Stevens, among
others?"7 Whichever approach is adopted, what variables are appropriate to
assess in reaching a decision?
14. See infra notes 68-147 and accompanying text (examining bounds of irearms posses-
sion in America and England).
15. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (proposing use of "constitutional cy
pres" to effect as much of Second Amendment's essential purpose as is possible in modem
times).
16. See infra notes 20-148 and accompanying text (discussing historical evidence).
17. See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,451 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that Supreme Court has applied "continuum of judgmental
responses" to equal protection cases); id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
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Perhaps these questions are so large and difficult that it is best to leave
the Second Amendment in its present desuetude. But that objection could
have been registered with respect to equal protection, or free speech, or estab-
lishment of religion. It will not do to emasculate constitutional guarantees
simply because they are difficult to implement. If the weight of evidence is
that the founding generation expected the Second Amendment to secure the
right of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms for their own individual and
collective defense, we ought to take seriously that intention. Of course, the
question of whether we are bound today by that intention is, as Jefferson
Powell has reminded us, a question of present-day political theory. 8 But if
we decide today that we should adhere to the view that the Second Amend-
ment guarantees to law-abiding citizens the right to possess firearms for the
defense of themselves and others, we cannot avoid the tough questions that
follow. That is the objective of the second part of this Article. 9
I. The Historical Record and Its Present Significance
There has been an enormous amount of research and writing exploring
the historical roots of the Second Amendment. My purpose here is not to re-
examine each of these sources in minute detail; rather, I intend to summarize
the essential positions and evidence of the contending camps in order to
express a conclusion about the meaning and utility of the historical record..
The reader who wishes to engage in the minutiae of the historical debate may
consult the cited sources.
The individual rights theorists contend that "the general attitude of the
Founders toward the role of arms in society ... involved a set of related
propositions that were deemed axiomatic truths."2 Two influential individual
rights theorists have summarized these propositions as including an inalien-
able, natural right to personal self-defense,21 a corollary right to "possess
in part) (stating that level of scrutiny in equal protection cases should vary based on constitu-
tional importance of right); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 98-110
(1973) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (suggesting that "variable standard of review" dependent on
fundamental nature of rights at stake is superior to confining review to strict scrutiny or mere
rationality).
18. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Or'ginalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 662 (1987)
(stating that "[h]istory cannot answer or even address the question whether modem Americans
ought to obey the intentions of the Constitution's founders").
19. See infra notes 177-201 and accompanying text
20. Barnett &Kates, supra note 1, at 1177.
21. Id. at 1177 n.184 (citing JOYCE LEE MALcoLM, To KEEP AND BEARPARMS: ThE
ORiGNS OF ANANGLo-AMEPIcAN RiaT (1994)) (asserting that Thomas Hobbes, Blackstone,
James Kent, and St George Tucker were all in agreement that self-defense was "primary law
of nature" (Blackstone) and "first law of nature" (Tucker)).
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personal arms for defense of self, home, and family,"' and a derivative right
to join together for collective defense.' These rights, saythesetheorists, were
regarded by the founding generation as assertable against depredations "perpe-
trated by apolitical criminals or for political purposes by a tyrant or his
thugs"24 and extended, "in the ultimate extreme, to the right to overthrow
tyrants and return government to its proper course."' Moreover, an armed
citizenry was thought to deter tyranny and oppression by govemment? and
was indispensable to maintenance of a free and republican societyY
To support these propositions, the individual rights theorists rely upon
statements made by various members of the founding generation in the context
of revolt from Great Britain and subsequent formation of the American na-
tional government. The statements are used fairly by individual rights theo-
rists, but the larger context of their utterance is sometimes given short shrift.
For example, The Federalist No. 46, authored by James Madison, contains
Madison's argument that the proposed Constitution would preserve the advan-
tage of an armed populace as "a barrier against the enterprises of [governmen-
tal] ambition."' The reason the original, unamended Constitution could pre-
serve this perceived advantage was that the federal government was given no
authorityto regulate private firearms possession. But Madison's argument also
suggests that state governments, 'to which the people are attached and by
which the militia officers are appointed,"2 will aid in the preservation of an
armed polity as a check on governmental tyranny, and thus says little aboutthe
power of state governments to regulate private firearms possession. Indeed,
22. Id. at 1178 n.85 (citing STEPHENP.HAIBROOK, THATEVERLYMANBEARMED: THE
EVOLUTION OF A CoNSTrrTIToNAL RiuntT (1984)); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the SecondAmendment, 9 HARV. 3J,. & PUB. POL'Y 559,
596-97 (1986) (discussing early state recognition of gun rights and their relation to state
militias); Kates, The SecondAmendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, supra note 1, at
104 (surveying colonial newspaper editorials and views of such thinkers and commentators as
Blackstone, Montesquieu, Algernon Sydney, and Thomas Paine).
23. Barnett & Kates, supra note 1, at 1178 n.186 (examining Sydney and Locke's view
that right of individuals to band together and to resist tyrannical rules flows from right of
individual self-defense (citing Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protec-
lion, supra note 1, at 93)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1179 (quoting eclectic set of sources including Madison, Paine, Trenchard, and
Timothy Dwight (citing Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection,
supra note 1, at 96-97)).
27. Id. (citing Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW &
CONTEmP. PROBS. 125, 138 (1986)).
28. THE FEDERAUST NO. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
29. Id.
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two possible constructions could be placed on the argument. The one com-
monly embraced by individual rights theorists is that Madison regarded private
firearms possession as a natural right that preexisted the formation of govern-
ment, and thus the Second Amendment "added nothing new to the original
Constitution. 30  As with other provisions of the Bill of Rights that protected
natural rights, it was inserted "for greater caution,"131 to negate any possibility
that the central government might be deemed to possess any implied authority
to regulate private firearms possession. 2 The other construction emphasizes
the federalism aspect of Madison's argument. Perhaps all that Madison meant
was that the Second Amendment was designed to prevent the federal govern-
ment from eliminating the states' power to regulate the militia. This construc-
tion de-emphasizes or ignores the natural rights aspect of firearms possession
and sees the Second Amendment as a guarantee to states of the power to
constitute an armed militia out oftheir citizenry. How the states exercised this
power was up to them.
Individual rights theorists counter by arguing that there was an over-
whelming sentiment among the founding generation that firearms possession
was an inalienable natural right and that this right was similarly recognized in
state constitutional bills of rights. Eugene Volokh has demonstrated that
many of the state constitutions drafted during the post-revolutionary era con-
tained some guarantee of the right to possess firearms. The fact that these
state constitutional provisions secured the right to firearms possession against
the state government prompted Volokh to conclude that these provisions nec-
essarily "recognize a right belonging to someone other than the state."34 It
need hardly be added that the "someone" was the mass of individuals compos-
ing the people.
Historians such as Saul Cornell have chided Volokh and other individual
rights theorists for their failure "adequately [to] contextualize constitutional
texts." 35 To make sense of constitutional text, claims Cornell, it is necessary
30. Barnett&Kates, supra note 1, at 1171.
31. James Madison so stated in his speech to the House presenting the proposed Bill of
Rights to the First Congress. 1 ANNALS oF CONGPSS 435 (J. Gales ed., 1834).
32. This is not to say that the Second Amendment barred the exercise of federal power
to regulate private Iirearm possession ancillay to some express grant of authority such as the
Commerce Clause.
33. Volokh, The Commonplace SecondAmendment, supra note 1, at 793 (isting Indian,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont as states
whose constitutions written between 1776 and 1820 specifically protected individual right to
possess firearms).
34. Id. at810.
35. Comell, supra note 1, at 225.
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"to analyze published and unpublished sources, private comments as well as
published statements... [and] political and social texts.' In short, "[t]he
behavior ofthe historical actors who wrote [constitutional] texts must be read
alongside their published statements."37 That behavior hardly demonstrates an
unqualified commitment to an individual right to bear arms. Cornell examines
Pennsylvania under its revolutionary constitution of 1776 as a test case38 and
concludes "that there was considerable conflict over how to understand" the
right to bear arms guaranteed by Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution.39
Atroughlythe sametimethe 1776 Constitutionwas adopted, Pennsylvania
enacted the Test Acts, which established a "stringent loyalty oath" as a pre-
condition to "voting, holding public office, serving on juries," and bearing
arms.4 The express rationale for denying the right to firearms possession to
those who refused to take the loyalty oath was that their refusal established
them as "persons disaffected to the liberty and independence" of Pennsylva-
nia.4' Cornell estimates that the Test Acts "stripped many essential rights
from... as much as forty percent of the citizemy," though he provides no basis
for his estimate.42 However many Pennsylvanians were affected, there can be
little doubt that Cornell is correct to observe that "[glun ownership in Pennsyl-
vania was based on the idea that one agreed to support the state .... Only
citizens who were willing to swear an oath to the state could claim the right to
bear arms. I" The Pennsylvania experience is thus a large obstacle to the claim
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Cornell defends his choice of Pennsylvania because (1) individual rights theorists rely
on Pennsylvania as a state where the founding generation conceived of firearms possession as
an individual right, and (2) during ratification, the state produced a particularly rich debate over
the Constitution's meaning. Id. at 227.
39. Article XII of the Declaration of Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776
proclaimed:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
state; and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to libcrty, they ought
not to be kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subordination
to, and governed by, the civil power.
5 THEFEDERALANDSTATECONSTITUTONS,COLONIALCHARTEEsANDOTHERORGANICLAWS
OF THE STATES, TliRr OEs, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING Tn UNITED
STATES OFAmECA 3083 (Francis Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter Thorpe].
40. Cornell, supra note 1, at 228.
41. Id. (quoting TestActas enacted in 1777).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 229. Cornell has less basis to make the claim elided in the quote - that gun
ownership was based on the idea that one agreed "to defend [the state] against those who might
use arms against it." Id. This claim conflates the right to gun possession on the part of a loyal
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of many individual rights theorists that an individual right to bear arms was
conceived as securing a popular right of armed resistance to governmental
tyranny." Moreover, this claim of individual rights theorists is inherently
suspicious, for it assumes that a constitutive document for a participatory
democracy would guarantee to the participants a right to destroy by force of
arms that democracy. Ofcourse, the pervasively Lockeanthought of American
revolutionaries posited a natural right of the people to revolt against any gov-
ernment that had transformed itself into a tyranny, and it might be plausible to
assume that the Second Amendment was, as Randy Barnett and Don Kates
claim, a simple recognition of such apreexistingnaturalright The experience
ofthe Whisky Rebellion, however, casts considerable doubt onthis assumption.
When the Federalist administration of George Washington levied excise
taxes on whisky, farmers in western Pennsylvania and Kentucky reacted with
violent anger.46 Not only did the Federalist Washington administration act
citizen for self-defense with the distinct and separate obligation of a loyal citizen to defend the
state against its enemies. The conflation may be due to Cornell's belief (if he does so believe)
that the right to bear arms existed only for the defense of the state, but because the Pennsylvania
Constitution expressly recognized the people's right to bear arms "for the defense of themselves
and the State" (emphasis added), it seems incumbent upon Cornell to reveal the evidence upon
which he relies to make the implicit claim that a loyal Pennsylvanian of the late 1770s did not
have an individual right to bear arms simply for his own defense. Perhaps Cornell meant only
that the rights were linked - one could not have the right to bear arms for self defense without
also undertaking an obligation to defend the state.
44. See generally, e.g., HALBROOK, THATEVERYMANBEARMED - THEEVOLUTIONOF
A CONSTiTUTIONAL RIGHT, supra note 1, at 29-32 (discussing John Locke and Algernon
Sydney's writings on importance of armed populace as guard against tyranny and noting
impression these works had on framers); WAYNE LA PIERM, GUNS, CRIME, AND FREEDOM
(1994); Charles Dunlop, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary
Theory ofthe SecondAmendment, 62 TEMN. L. REV. 643,64445 (1995) (examining "insurrec-
tionary theory" and whether "Second Amendment still represents a legally valid and militarily
sound means to resist tyranny"). The source of this claim is often Justice Story's "palladium of
liberty" quote, characterizing the Second Amendment as "the palladium of the liberties of a
republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of
rulers; and will generally... enable the people to resist and triumph over them." 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTIuTON OF TBE UNIED STATES § 1890 (1833). Cf.
Levinson, supra note 1, at 646 (defining relationship between community and state military
apparatus); Reynolds, supra note 1, at 472 (noting that Declaration of Independence and several
state constitutions written before U.S. Constitution contain "insurrectionist" language guarantee-
ing right of citizens to overthrow tyrannical government).
45. See supra note 30 (arguing that right to keep and to bear arms was not included
specifically in unamended Constitution because federal government was assumed to have no
power to limit pre-existing natural rights).
46. See generally THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLON: FRONTIER EPI-
LOGUE TO THE AMERICANREVOLrION (1986). The impact of the whisky tax was felt by these
frontier farmers because it was far more economical, given the remoteness of the region, for the
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with arms to quell what it regarded as an armed revolt against democratic
government, Anti-Federalist opponents of the administration divided on the
question of whether the armed rebellion was proper.' According to historian
Saul Cornell,
leading Anti-Federalists did not believe that individuals could spontane-
ously constitute themselves as militia units outside the control of the state
or assert an individual right to bear arms to check government tyranny.
[Even] the radical Anti-Federalists who did assert such a right did not
ground it any constitutional text, but instead framed their actions in terms
of a natural, not a constitutional, right of revolution.'
It is possible, of course, that the radical Anti-Federalists thought the natural
right of revolution was simply restated by the Second Amendment. But a
right of revolution needs no constitutional foundation for it to be effective,
and a constitutionally guaranteed right of revolution is meaningless if the
revolution fails to succeed. The American Revolution proved the first propo-
sition; the Civil War (from a Southern perspective) proved the second. What-
ever the radical Anti-Federalists may have thought, the result of the Whisky
Rebellion was a clear repudiation of the idea that individuals possessed a
constitutional right of armed resistance to governmental authority.
Individual rights theorists also make a related, albeit slightly different,
claim: The presence of an armed citizenry was thought desirable for its
deterrent effect on governmental actors inclined to become tyrants." But this
argument is also refuted by Pennsylvania's insistence that only loyal citizens
could possess arms. True, a citizen may be loyal to democracy and a revolu-
tionary firebrand when democracy turns to tyranny, but the point is that
Pennsylvania did not concede to individuals a right to decide for themselves
when that degradation of democracy into tyranny had occurred. If it had
conceded such a right, presumably Pennsylvanians would have had no cause
to upbraid their fellow Pennsylvanians who were resisting the federal whisky
tax with force of arms. But upbraid them they did, and much of the condem-
nation came from Anti-Federalists." Moreover, the argument that an individ-
farmers to turn their grain crops into whisky and sell that high value, highly portable product
than to transport the bulky grain to markets.
47. Comell, supra note 1, at 242-45 (discussing dissent among Anti-Federalists to violent
uprisings against government).
48. Id. at 242. For Cornell's supporting evidence, see id. at 242-45 (identifying Anti-
Federalist opposition to use of force by instigators of Whisky Rebellion).
49. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 1, at 647-51 (explaining "checking value" of armed
populace on governmental tyranny); Reynolds, supra note 1, at 467-71 (reasoning that armed
citizenry serve as check to standing army).
50. See Comell, supra note 1, at 242-45 (reviewing debate of two prominent Anti-Feder-
alists, William Findley and William Petrikan, over use of violence against unjust laws).
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ual right to firearms was intended as a deterrent to tyranny is inherently
unstable, for it assumes that each individual may act, or threaten to act, against
the tyranny he sees. How else is tyranny to be defined? Timothy McVeigh
presumably acted against atyranny thathe perceived, butthat does not justify
his actions. Would Lee Harvey Oswald have had a Second Amendment right
to assert in his defense if he sincerely believed that John Kennedy was a
tyrant? When Dan White shot and killed San Francisco mayor George
Moscone in retaliation for Moscone's refusal to reappoint him to the city
legislature, from which White had improvidently resigned, was White assert-
ing an individual right to combat tyranny?
The evidence from historical practice may adequately puncture the
inflated claim that the Second Amendment preserves an individual right to
bear arms either to deter or to revolt against tyranny, but it does not necessar-
ily deflate the claim that the Second Amendment preserves an individual right
to bear arms for self defense. State constitutions repeatedly proclaim that
every citizen has the right to bear arms "in defense of himself and the state."'"
And every American constitutional expression of a right to bear arms - the
Second Amendment and every analogous state constitutional provision - is
expressly calculated to aid the common defense of the community against
armed attack." If there is one thing the Second Amendment is surely about,
it is defense. Collective rights theorists accentuate the importance of the pro-
-vision to secure the common defense through an armed militia.5" Individual
rights theorists accentuate the importance of the provision to secure individual
defense.' But the two positions are not antagonistic; indeed they reinforce
one another by emphasizing the common theme of defense: of self, of other
individuals, and ofthe community as a whole. Indeed, to the founding genera-
tion the right and obligation to defend oneself was indistinguishable from the
right and obligation to defend the community.55 Blackstone treated the right
to bear arms as one of the "absolute" natural rights of individuals, rooted in
51. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26. Similar language appears in at least twenty state constitu-
tions. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arns Provisions, at
http//www.law.ula.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm (last visited on Feb. 5, 2001)
(collecting state constitutional provisions on right to bear arms).
52. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arns, at http'/
www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/bearamsstatecon.htm (last visited on Feb. 5, 2001).
53. See supra notes 20-51 and accompanying text (examining arguments of collective
rights theorists).
54. See supra notes 20-51 and accompanying text (discussing arguments of collective
rights theorists).
55. Kates, The SecondAmendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, supra note 1, at
87 (elaborating on idea that act of self-defense, by thwarting crime against oneself, serves
community as well).
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ancient Saxon law that guaranteed to every freeman the right to possess and
to use arms." Not only did Blackstone treat the right as an individual right,
he clearly explained its rationale as "for self-preservation and defence.0 7 As
Don Kates has shown, early Americans believed that the moral virtue of
armed self-defense was coupled with a moral obligation to bear arms for
collective defense. 8
In the Greek and Roman republics from whose example [the founders]
took so many lessons, every free man had been armed so as to be prepared
both to defend his family against outlaws and to man the city walls in
immediate response to the tocsin warning of approaching enemies. Thus
did each citizen commit himself to the fulfillment of both his private and
public responsibilities.59
Collective rights theorists take issue with these conclusions by demon-
strating that a wide variety of gun regulations were adopted and enforced both
before and after the Second Amendment. To undermine the contention that
an individual right to bear arms was imported to America from England, as
historian Joyce Lee Malcolm claims,' ° collective rights theorists charge that
English law was studded with gun restrictions both before and after the
Declaration of Rights of 1689 affirmed the right of Protestants to bear arms
"for their defence suitable to their condition and as allowed by law. "I Carl
Bogus, for example, contends that Malcolm is "patently wrong" in asserting
that the right to bear arms protected by the English Declaration of Rights was
designed to insure that individuals had the right to possess and to use arms for
self-defense.62
The common theme of the collective rights theorists is that these laws -
both in England and America - denied a great many people access to firearms
for any purpose, and thus one cannot claim that there was any meaningful
general individual right to bear arms.' The essential claim is that because the
56. Id. at 93-94 (explaining that Blackstone viewed individual right to have and to use
arms for self-protection as absolute).
57. WILAMBLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 144(1765).
58. Kates, The SecondAmendment and the Ideology ofSelf-Protection, supra note 1, at
94-96 (analyzing historical precedent of arms possession as civic virtue).
59. Id. at 95.
60. JoYcE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGL -
AMEaicAN RiGirr 149 (1994).
61. Lois G. SCHWOERER, T DECLARATION OFRiGTS, 1689, at297 (1981).
62. Bogus, supra note 1, at 377.
63. See, e.g., Bellesiles, Gun Laws, supra note 1, at 573-76 (stating that Parliament and
colonial legislatures routinely restricted gun ownership rights to narrow classes of individuals);
Bellesiles, Origins, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that most states had laws forbidding blacks to
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right to bear arms in England, its American colonies, and the newly independ-
ent United States frequently was limited by ordinary legislation, it is manifest
error to suppose that the founding generation meant the Second Amendment
to secure a broad individual right to bear arms. There are, however, a number
of problems with this argument.
First, many of the limitations on gun possession corresponded to limits
on access to the polity itself. The Massachusetts theocratic legislature in 1637
barred Antinomians from owning guns." More frequently, gun possession
was limited to white adult Protestant property owners.' Women, slaves,
indentured servants, the propertyless, Catholics, Indians, and youths were all
excluded from gun ownership. But these same categories also were excluded
from participation in civic government. Historians who claim that the individ-
ual rights theorists are guilty of anachronism fall victim to their own brand
of anachronism. The existence of firearms regulations in the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries limiting the right to possess firearms to
the citizenry that also was entrusted with the franchise is entirely consistent
with the claim that there existed then an individual right to bear arms, a right
possessed only by those individuals who composed the civic polity. To
disprove the claim that such an individual right to bear arms existed, it is
necessary to establish that statutes of the founders' time limited the right of
free adult, white, male citizens - the polity of the day - to possess firearms.
By and large, the historical evidence marshaled by the collective rights
theorists is not adequate to this task.
The reason so much energy and passion is expended today on what the
founders did or did not do about firearms regulation is that such evidence is
thought relevant to our contemporary debate about the proper extent of
firearms regulation. The contemporary claim of individual rights theorists is
that the Second Amendment guarantees a presumptive right to firearms
possession by law-abiding, mentally stable adults.' The historical practices
that would cast doubt on this claim are not laws that barred the disenfran-
chised from firearms possession, but laws that limited access by franchise
holders to firearms. In short, the fact that Virginia barred Sally Hemings from
owning a gun does not wreck the present-day claims of individual rights
own guns); Cornell, supra note 1, at 228 (discussing that in 1776 Pennsylvania's Test Acts
allowed state to disarm citizens who refused to take loyalty oath).
64. Bellesiles, Gun Laws, supra note 1, at 574.
65. Id.
66. See Comell, supra note 1, at 221.
67. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Public Safety and the Right to
BearArms, in THE BL OF RiGtTs INMODERNAMEcICA 85-86 (David J. Bodenhamer & James
W. Ely eds., 1993).
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theorists. But if it could be shown that Virginia limited Thomas Jefferson's
right to possess firearms, that historical practice would go a long way toward
refuting the claims of the individual rights theorists. In fact, however, the
historical evidence points to the opposite conclusion. Far from restricting gun
ownership by enfiachised Virginians, Virginia (and other states) "encouraged
the private ownership of firearms by white male property owners. '
To be sure, there are cogent arguments from historical practice to support
the collective rights theorists. English firearms regulations of the seventeenth
century and earlier impinged significantly upon the right of enfranchised
members of the polity to use firearms. England's 1541 militia statute, for
example, flatly prohibited ownership of handguns to all but the very wealthy.69
Other English firearms regulations were designed to disarm the general
populace in order to preserve game for the wealthy, propertied gentry." But
even these statutes, which prohibited the use of guns for hunting by all but the
very wealthy, did not absolutely forbid gun ownership by the ordinary citizen.
English law did, however, mandate an inventory of private firearms'71 and
required registration offirearms.72 Other English firearms laws were designed
to prohibit arms possession by those known or suspected to be disaffected
with the government. Such persons were, of course, considered traitors and
not part of the polity.
Joyce Lee Malcolm, a leading individual rights theorist, claims in her
influential book, To Keep andBearArms: The Origins ofanAnglo-Ameican
Right, that such legislation was rendered illegitimate by the English Declara-
tion of Rights of 1689."4 The validity of this claim depends partly upon
whether the Declaration of Rights was, indeed, merely declaratory of ancient
pre-existing rights75 or a radical document of reform,76 and partly upon a
68. Bellesiles, Gun Laws, supra note 1, at 580.
69. See MALCOuM, supra note 60, at 9-10,80 (describing 1541 statute prohibiting anyone
with annual income of less than 100 pounds from owning handgun). Bellesiles attributes this
prohibition to the fact that handguns are "easily concealed and therefore more likely to be used
in the commission of a crime," but offers no support for the claim. Bellesiles, Gun Laws, supra
note 1, at 572.
70. Bellesiles, Gun Laws, supra note 1, at 567, 572 ("As Blackstone noted, under the
game act [of 1671], the right to hunt - and thus to own a gun without fear of its expropriation -
required fifty times as much property as the right to vote.").
71. See MALCOLM, supra note 60, at 28 (discussing 1659 law requiring inventory of
private firearms).
72. See id. at 43 (describing 1660 law that required firearms registration).
73. See id. at 35-36 (describing Charles H's order to seize weapons from all those of
known or suspected disaffection to crown).
74. Id. at 74, 121-22.
75. This is the conventional wisdom of eminent English historians of the past, such as
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parsing of the text of its right to arms provision and the evidence of its draft-
ers' intentions. Article Seven of the Declaration of Rights states "[t]hat the
subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to
their condition and as allowed by law."' Because prior firearms legislation
repeatedly distinguished between the gentry and yeomanry and imposed regu-
lations that pinched even the gentry at times, it is a reasonable conclusion that
this provision was intended to be declaratory of pre-existing rights." This is
surely consistent with the general tenor ofthe Glorious Revolution, which was
an assertion of a prior tradition of parliamentary power against an over-
reaching and over-bearing monarch, suffused with the restoration of Protestant
hegemony in Britain. Lois Schwoerer, the leading modem scholar of the
Glorious Revolution, asserts that Article Seven was not intended to create an
individual right to possess firearms held by all Protestants.79 Her reading of
the provision is that the qualifying phrases, inserted by the House of Lords,
were intended to insure that the gentry kept their preferred status with respect
to arms (and, more to the point, that the yeomanry were denied ready access
to firearms) and certainly were not intended to deny the legitimacy of the
preceding century and a half of firearms regulation by Parliament."0
While such analysis may undermine the claim that American colonists
possessed an individual right to firearms possession via the 1689 Declaration
of Rights, it hardly disposes of the possibility that American colonists turned
revolutionaries perceived in the Declaration of Rights a different legacy than
that intended by the Englishmen who preceded them by a century. There was
nothing novel about American colonists applying English law for their own
purposes. In 1610, Lord Coke had ruled in Bonham's Case"' that "when an
Act of Parliament is against common right or reason... the common law will
controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void."' Whatever Coke may have
Macauley and Trevelyan. Macauley flatly asserted that, by the Bill of Rights, "[n]ot a single
new right was given to the people." 2 MACAuLEY'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 377 (1906).
Trevelyan agreed: "[The Declaration of Right] introduced no new principle of law." J.
TREVELYAN, THE ENGuSH REVOLUTION 1688-1689, at 150 (1938).
76. This is the position of Lois Schwoerer, perhaps the foremost recent analyst of the
Glorious Revolution. See SCaWOERER, supra note 61, at 283 (explaining that Declaration of
Rights is properly regarded as radical reforming document). However, Swhwoerer asserts that
the Declaration's right to arms provision was merely a reaffirmation of "ancient law." Id. at 78.
77. Id. at297 (reprinting text ofDeclaration of Rights).
78. Even Schwoerer, the most notable champion of the reformist view of the Declaration
of Rights, agrees that Article Seven was declaratory of ancient law. Id. at 78.
79. Id. at 74-78.
80. Id. at 74,77.
81. 8 Coke's Rep. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
82. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke's Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646,652 (KB. 1610).
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meant by this cryptic observation,s his successor to the mantle of commenta-
tor upon the sweep of English law, Blackstone, had no doubt. Writing in the
middle of the eighteenth century, Blackstone declared that "if the Parliament
will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no
power that can control it."' But at roughly the same time Blackstone was
writing, American colonists were placing their own, and distinctly different,
interpretation upon Bonham's Case. In 1761 James Otis, Jr. relied on Bon-
ham's Case to urge a colonial court to strike down the use of general search
warrants authorized by acts of Parliament. 85 Americans were aware that they
were changing English law to adapt to their American circumstances. John
Adams later said of Otis's use of Bonham's Case that "[tihen and there the
child Independence was born."' 6
The same phenomenon occurred with the right to possess firearms.
Historians increasingly are of the opinion that there was an "incredible...
diversity of American political culture in the Revolutionary era."'  The
American recognition of the right to possess firearms reflects that pluralist
conception of early American political thought. The most plausible reading
ofthe firearms provision of the English Declaration of Rights is that it merely
restated an existing tradition of denying lawful access to firearms to ecclesias-
tical and political outcasts (Catholics and traitors) and the yeomanry, with the
result that national defense was reposed in a professional army. But Ameri-
cans, although divided ontheirAmerican understanding ofthe proper meaning
of their hereditary right to bear arms, united in rejecting this English under-
standing.
Americans of the founding generation perceived the right to possess and
to use firearms as a multi-faceted issue. One commonly held view was that
the right to possess firearms was a natural right of all adult; free, law-abiding
male citizens. This view was expressed in such well-known texts as the 1776
Pennsylvania Constitution, which declared "that the people have a right to
83. Historians have debated the issue. Compare Theodore Plucknett,Bonham 's Case and
JudicialReview, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30,31-32 (1926) (contending thatBonham's Case relies on
theory of unwritten fundamental law) with Samuel Thome, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 LAW Q.
REV. 543, 548-52 (1938) (asserting that Bonham's Case was merely one of especially strict
statutory construction).
84. 1 WI.AM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ONTHE LAW OF ENGLAND 91 (1765).
85. See MAURICE SMrriH, TBE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 358-61 (1978) (describing
Otis's reliance on Coke's dicta inBonham's Case).
86. 10 THE WoRKs oF JOHNADAMS 248 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1856).
87. Comell, supra note 1, at 222. Among the many examples of historical work drawing
on this "pluralist model of early American political and constitutional thought," id. at 223, are
FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM (1985) and JACK RAKOVE, OPIGINALMEAN-
INGs: POiaTICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAmIG OF THE CONsnTUmON (1996).
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bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state,"s and the 1777 Ver-
mont Declaration of Rights, which stated "[t]hat the people have a right to
bear arms for the defence ofthemselves and the State."89 Kentucky's constitu-
tion contained similar language," while Massachusetts and North Carolina
guaranteed the people's right to bear arms for the "common defence" 9 or for
"the defence of the State."' Commentators as politically diverse as Tench
Coxe and John Adams, for example, maintained that the right to bear arms
included an individual right. In urging ratification of the Constitution, Coxe
responded to the call of Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists for an amendment to
preserve "the peoples['s] ... right to bear arms for the defense of themselves
and their own state, or the United States" and to prevent Congress from
"disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real
danger of public injury from individuals."' Writing in the Pennsylvania
Gazette under the pseudonym "A Pennsylvanian," Coxe declared that "Con-
gress have no power to disarm the militia" because the "terrible implement[s]
of the soldier are the birthright of an American... [and the] unlimited power
of the sword is not in the hands of either the Federal or state governments,
but... in the hands of the people."" And "[w]ho are the militia?" asked
Coxe; "are they not ourselves, . . . the yeomanry of America from sixteen to
sixty.''19 In more restrained language, Adams concluded that the state consti-
tutions of America secured to law-abiding individuals the right to use arms in
self-defense.96 There was nothing particularly controversial about the right of
88. PA. CONST. art. XI (1776), available in 5 Thorpe, supra note 39, at 3083.
89. VT. DECLARATION OF RIGTS art. XV (1777), available in 6 Thorpe, supra note 39,
at 3741.
90. See KY. CONST. art. XIL § 23 (1792), available in 3 Thorpe, supra note 39, at 1275
("That the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be
questioned.").
91. MASS. CONST. pt 1, art. XVII (1780), available in 3 Thorpe, supra note 39, at
1892.
92. N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art XVII (1776), available in 5 Thorpe, supra note
39, at 2788.
93. 2 THEDOCUmENTARYHISTORYOFTHERATiFICATIONOFTHECONSTHTJIoN623-24
(Merill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. The quoted statements are
taken from a manifesto published by the Anti-Federalist opponents of ratification in Pennsylva-
nia, in which they set forth the rights of the people they contended were insufficiently protected
by the proposed Constitution. Id.
94. Stephen Halbrook & David Kopel, Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep andBearArms,
1787-1823,7 WM. &MARYBIELRTS. . 347,363 (1999) (quoting Coxe's February 20,1788
letter to Pennsylvania Gazette under pseudonym "A Pennsylvanian").
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., 3 J. ADAMS,A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475 (1787) (stating that one of constitutional liberties ofAmeri-
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self-defense. Blackstone declared self-defense such a "primary law of nature"
that it was incapable of being 'taken away by the law of society."' Perhaps
such natural rights sentiments impelled the New Hampshire ratifying conven-
tion to propose that "Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as
are or have been in Actual Rebellion."s No doubt Americans ofthe founding
era agreed with Blackstone, but that does not necessarily mean that they all
thought the Second Amendment was the vehicle for restating this fundamental
natural right.
A different rationale for securing the right to bear arms was rooted in the
fear of a standing army and the fear that, without a right-to-arms provision in
the Constitution, the federal government might disarm the states' militias. Carl
Bogus recently has provided a thorough explication ofthis view," although he
casts the fear of a federal disarmament of the states' militias as entirely a fear
of Southern slaveholders, an explanation that Bogus concedes is based purely
on circumstantial evidence.l"o Southerners may have had their unique, peculiar
reasons for writing into the Constitution an express guarantee of state authority
to maintain an armed militia, but concern that the federal government might
disarm the militia was far broader than Bogus implies. A great deal of the
impetus for the Second Amendment was rooted in fear that a standing army
could become an instrument of oppression, as the Royal Army had been
perceived to be during and prior to the Revolution. An armed militia would go
a long way toward checking this danger. Tench Coxe's peroration inthe pages
of the Pennsylvania Gazette during the ratification debate is a representative
sample of this viewpoint.' 1 But the question of who comprised this armed
militia was yet another ficet of the right to possess arms.
The framers generally accepted the idea that the militia potentially
included every able-bodied, free adult male, roughly the white male popula-
tion from ages eighteen through forty-five (according to the federal Militia
Act of 1792") or from ages sixteen through sixty (according to Tench Coxe's
cans was that "arms in the hands of citizens [could be] used at individual discretion... in
private self-defcnce").
97. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *4 (1765).
98. CRFATmNG THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ThE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM TBE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGmss 17 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF
RIrs].
99. See Bogus, supra note 1, at 309 (arguing that Second Amendment was written to
assure Southern states that Congress would not disarm state militias).
100. Id. at372.
101. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing Coxe's letter in support of right
to bear arms).
102. Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat 271 ("[E]ach and every free able-
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fiery statement in the Pennsylvania Gazette). Virginia's ratifying convention
proposed a declaration of rights, the seventeenth of which declared "[t]hat the
people have a right to keep and bear arms" and "that a well-regulated militia,
composed ofthe body ofthe people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and
safe defence of a free state.""les New York's proposal was similar, declaring
"[tihat the People have a right to keep and bear Arms; that a well regulated
Militia, including the body of the People capable of bearing Arms, is the
proper, natural and safe defence of a free State.""'  The United States Su-
preme Court agreed. In United States v. Miller,"5 the only twentieth century
Supreme Court decision to construe the Second Amendment, the Court con-
cluded that the relevant eighteenth century evidence showed "plainly enough
that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for
the common defense."'"
Arrayed against this is the textual fact that Article I, Section 8 plainly
vests in Congress the power to "organiz[e], arm[ ], and disciplin[e] the Mili-
tia.1'1°r That fhct, of course, was part of what spurred Anti-Federalist oppo-
nents of the Constitution to demand a right-to-arms provision in the Bill of
Rights. But when James Madison introduced what would become the Second
Amendment in the First Congress his draft referred to a "well armed and well
regulated" militia but it made no mention ofthe composition of that militia."°
Carl Bogus theorizes that this was a deliberate omission, motivated by Madi-
son's desire to leave intact Congress's power to define the composition of the
militia by exercising its Article I, Section 8 authority to "organiz[e]" the
militia."° Whether or not that was so, the House of Representatives added to
the proposed Second Amendment language that would define the militia as
"composed of the body of the people,"" 0 and the Senate promptly removed
that language."'
bodied white male citizen of the respective states, residing therein, .. of the age of eighteen
years, and under the age of forty-five years... shall... be enrolled in the militia).
103. 3 TE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDML4LCONSTrITUON 659 (Jonathan Elliot d.,2d ed. 1888) [hereinafterELUOT's DEATES].
North Carolina's proposal was identical. 4 ELUoT's DEBATEs 244.
104. CREATING THE BILL OF RIarS, supra note 98, at 22.
105. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
106. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,179 (1939).
107. U.S. CONsT. art. , § 8, el. 16.
108. CREATING THE BILL OF RicI, supra note 98, at 12 (providing test of Madison's
resolution).
109. Bogus, supra note 1, at 367-68.
110. CREATING T BIL OF RIGETS, supra note 98, at 30, 38.
111. See id. at 46 (describing Senate Amendments to Bill of Rights).
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The contemporaneous history of militia regulation and firearms regula-
tion bears as well on the identity of the militia that forms the heart of the
justification clause of the Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."" 2 Historian Michael Bellesiles con-
cludes that "[tjwo competing attitudes toward the public nature of firearms
ownership in early America are evident: the encouragement [through militia
legislation] of male citizens to bear arms, and the state's right to regulate who
could bear arms and when."'
3
[While] the rightto own guns was collectivelygrantedtolaw-abidingwhite
adult Protestant males... [states] and communities had the authority and
responsibility to deny gun possession to those perceived as a threat to
social stability, a standard that shifted over time to include nonwhites,
workers, the foreign born, and criminals.'
And they did. "Every state had gun control legislation on its books at the time
the Second Amendment was approved. Every state continued to pass such
legislation after the Second Amendment became the law of the land, and they
were joined in such regulatory efforts by the federal government.""'
But this history does not dispose of the individual rights claim, although
collective rights theorists and historians argue that it does." 6 Ifthere had been
a consensus that the Second Amendment neither created nor recognized an
individual right, it is reasonable to expect that consensus to be present in the
early judicial decisions interpreting state constitutional provisions securing
the rightto bear arms, provisions that for the most part were nearly identical to
the Second Amendment. Michael Bellesiles claims that "court after court" in
this era "agreed with... Tennessee's high court inAymette v. State (1840) that
'The single individual... is not spoken of or thought of as '"bearing arms.'1
11 7
This statement significantly distorts what these courts really said.
In reviewing the antebellum case law, which was generated mostly by
Southern statutes designed to curb revenge killings by forbidding the carrying
of concealed weapons, David Kopel concludes that the "solid majority of
courts that reviewed the gun control laws ... under the Second Amendment
and its state analogues [upheld] the particular control, while affirming an
112. U.S. CONST. amend. IL
113. Bellesiles, Gun Laws, supra note 1, at 589.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 587.
116. See id. (claiming that such gun control legislation is evidence that Second Amend-
ment was not intended to secure individual right to bear arms).
117. Id. at 587.
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individual right to own and carry guns.""' Aymette v. State19 provides a good
example, especially because Bellesiles relies on it for the opposite point.2
The Tennessee court relied on the arms provision of the Tennessee constitu-
tion, which protected '"he right of the people to keep and bear arms for their
common defence," '' to uphold Tennessee's ban on concealed weapons. The
right to bear arms did not extend to "private" defense; the constitutional right
did not secure "use of those weapons which are usually employed in private
broils, and which are efficient only in the hands of the robber and the assas-
sin.' 2 2 But the Aymette court also declared that "citizens have the unqualified
right to keep [weapons, though] the right to bear arms is not . . . unquali-
fied. n12 3 Tennessee abandoned this fine and subtle distinction thirty-one years
later in Andrews v. State."4 Again interpreting the Tennessee constitution's
arms provision, but equating its substance with the Second Amendment, the
Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the '"purpose ofthe right is to secure
a militia!"' but this "necessarily involves the right to purchase and use
[firearms] in such a way as is usual, or to keep them for the ordinary purposes
to which they are adapted .... [This] right and use are guaranteed to the
citizen... in subordinationto the general ends of civil society."'26 Despite its
declared purpose for the firearms right, the Andrews court did not suggest that
the citizen's right either to keep or to use arms was limited to his involvement
in the militia, but was limited by the "general ends of civil society."' 7 In
short, individuals have the right to keep and to use arms so long as that prac-
tice does not pose a threat to civil society."
118. Kopel, supra note 1, at 1416.
119. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154(1840).
120. See Bellisiles, Gun Laws, supra note 1, at 587-89.
121. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154,158 (1840) (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 150.
124. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871).
125. Id. at 178.
126. Id.
127. Id
128. See id. (stating that right to keep and bear arms is subordinate to "general ends of
civil society."). Of course, it is at this point that the modem policy debate begins. Gun aboli-
tionists contend that the very existence of guns is a mortal threat to civil society. See, e.g.,
Jerome P. Kassirer, Guns in the Household, 329 NEWENG. J.MED. 1117,1117 (1993) (discuss-
ing gun related accidents in homes). Gun defenders argue that armed virtuous citizens help
maintain civil society by deterring and reducing crime. See generally JOHN LoTr, JR., MORE
GuNs, LEss CRE: UNDESTANDINGCRIME AND GUN CoNTRoLLAWs (William U Landes &
J. Mark Ramseyer eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998) (concluding that armed citizens reduce
and deter crime).
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An 1846 Georgia Supreme Court decision, Nunn v. State,129 used the
Second Amendment to invalidate partially a Georgia law -that prohibited either
the sale or possession of small pistols. 30 In sweeping language, the Georgia
court opined that "any law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution"
if it "contravenes [the] right ofthe whole people, old and young, men, women
and boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and
not such merely as are used by the militia."'3 The Georgia court asserted,
perhaps with some hyperbole, that this right was a natural right "originally
belonging to our forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I and his two
wicked sons and successors, re-established by the revolution of 1688, con-
veyed to this land of liberty by the colonists, and finally incorporated conspic-
uously in our own Magna Chartal" Of course, the Nunn court was wrong
to assume that the Second Amendment applied to Georgia, since thirteen years
earlier the Marshall Court had ruled, in Barron v. Baltimore,'33 that the Bill
of Rights applied only to the federal government; however, the Nunn court's
gaffe does not undermine its view of the substance of the Second Amendment
guarantee.
134
These cases are but a small sampling of the nineteenth century state cases
that are canvassed by David Kopel.'3  A common theme of these cases is that
the right to bear arms, whether expressed in the Second Amendment or a state
constitutional analogue, was rooted in a fear of standing armies.'36 These state
courts consistently derived from that concern the principle that the firearms
right was intended to create an armed populace that could form a militia to
defend the country and simultaneously deter tyranny.13 7 Courts split on the
question of whether the arms right included an individual right to carry arms
for self-defense.138 Although the most widely shared view ofthese courts was
129. 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
130. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 252 (1846) (finding statute invalid insofar as it pro-
hibited open possession offirearms).
131. Id. at 251.
132. Id.
133. 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 243 (1833).
134. See Barron v. Mnyor & City Council ofBaltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Nunn,
1 Ga. at 251 (describing substance of Second Amendment guarantee).
135. Kopel, supra note 1, at 1415-33.
136. See supra notes 118-34 and accompanying text (describing early cases expounding
on right to bear arms).
137. See supra notes 118-34 and accompanying text (describing cases expounding on
right to bear arms).
138. Compare State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418,422-23 (1843) (holding that right to
bear arms included individual right of self-defense) with Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.)
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that the arms right was designed to secure the common defense, "every nine-
teenth century state court judge who said anything about the Second Amend-
ment, except for one concurring judge in an 1842 Arkansas case, agreed that
it protected the right of individual Americans to own firearms."'139 These
positions are not in tension; courts evidently thought that individuals with
guns were the backbone of national defense and were a vital security against
tyranny. Moreover, some courts were willing to read the Second Amendment
as a virtually absolute guarantee of the citizen's right to own and to use arms
for personal self-defense, 4 ' while other courts read state arms provisions as
guaranteeing a personal rightto own and to carry "arms as are commonly kept,
according to the customs of the people, and are appropriate for open and
manly use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for the [common]
defense,"'41 and some courts construed these provisions to exclude any right
to carry concealed weapons for self-defense. 42
The antebellum split in the state courts over the extent, if at all, to which
the Second Amendment guaranteed a right to own and to use arms in self-
defense can be read several different ways. It corroborates the view com-
monly expressed by collective rights theorists that there was no consensus that
the rightto bear arms always was thought of as an individual right. But it also
corroborates the claims of individual rights theorists that a considerable
portion of the polity thought the firearms right did extend to individuals. It is
not possible to be dogmtic (and correct) on this point. At most, the ante-
bellum state court cases confirm the message supplied by the eighteenth
century historical sources: The right to bear arms is an intellectual helix. One
strand is the collective right of the people to defend themselves against
organized, collective armed aggression, the other strand is the individual right
of the people to defnd themselves against individual acts of armed aggres-
sion.
If further confirmation of this reading were needed, it is amply supplied
by the behavior of the "Reconstruction Founders": the practices, legislative
debates, and resulting legislation that poured forth from the victorious Union
governmeAt, dominated by Republicans. One of the post-war evils that the
federal government sought to address was the systematic seizure by gangs of
154, 158 (1840) (holding that right to bear arms in Tennessee Constitution did not extend to
private defense).
139. Kopel, supra note 1, at 1433.
140. State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250,254-55 (1844).
141. State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455,458 (1875).
142. See, e.g., State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18,24-25 (1842) (upholding statute prohibiting
concealed firearms); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489,490 (1850) (finding Second Amendment
protects right to carry arms "in full view").
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whites of private anus held by newly freed blacks. Often these seizures were
authorized by state laws that specifically denied to blacks the right to bear
arms. But Republican officials of the federal government repeatedly charac-
terized these state laws as infiinging upon the Second Amendment right to
bear arms. 43 In order to secure effectively this right (as well as others),
Congress enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which guaranteed to newly freed
slaves "the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning
personal liberty [and] personal security, ... including the constitutional right
to bear arms."'"4 It is hardly likely that the Reconstruction Congress thought
that by this legislation they were merely directing southern states to include
blacks in the militia. Afer all, it was that militia, under the label of the
Confederate States Army, that had proven so stubborn and vexatious that it
required four years and a million human casualties to subdue. As citizens,
surely blacks were entitled to participate in the militia,145 but the immediate
concern of Congress was not assuring that blacks served in state militias;
rather, Congress wanted to aid black Americans in resisting the continuing
criminal depredations by the Ku Klux Klan and similar white gangsters.
Again and again the theme of an individual right to own and to use arms in
self-defense comes through in the debates and legislation produced by the
Reconstruction Congresses. 46 It is not clear how many newly freed blacks
had either the means or ability to procure arms, but it is abundantly clear that
Congress, in acting to make certain that black people possessed the right to
bear arms, was evidencing "plainly a concern about the self-defense rights of
individual citizens, especially freedmen.
147
This history has prompted Akhil Amar to conclude that the Second
Amendment acquired an additional meaning in the immediate aftermath ofthe
Civil War.148 Before the Civil War the function of the Second Amendment
143. Kopel, supra note 1, at 1448 (quoting 1866 legislative report of Joint Committee on
Reconstruction stating that laws were "a plain and direct violation of their personal rights as
guaranteed in the Constitution").
144. Act of July 6, 1866,14 Stat 173,176 (1866).
145. See Kopel, supra note 1, at 1453 (quoting Report of Joint Committee on Rconstruc-
tion, H.R. Rep. No. 39-30, at 229 (1866)) (focusing on statement of Mississippi Republican in
debate upon 1875 Civil Rights bill that all citizens of United States compose militia "and the
colored man composes part of these").
146. Id. at 1450-53.
147. Id. at 1454.
148. SeegeneraIlyAKILREMDAMARTHEBI-LOFRIGHTS:CREATIONANDRECONSTRUC-
TION, 257-66 (1998) (asserting that Second Amendment protected right to bear arms for self-
defense); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193 (1992).
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was to assure the states the power to maintain quasi-independent militias
composed of the polity for the purpose of resisting armed aggression, whether
the threat be domestic or foreign. 49 After the Civil War, the Second Amend-
ment acquired an additional goal: insuring the personal security of all citizens
by guaranteeing to them a personal right to resist criminal attacks.5 0 The
personal security purpose of the Second Amendment did not originate in
the Reconstruction, however. It was always there, embodied by the recitations
in such revolutionary constitutions as Pennsylvania and Vermont5 that
the right to bear arms was in part to enable the virtuous citizen to defend
himself. In terms of the right to arms, the aftiath of the Civil War was a
case study in extension of the arms right as the polity was radically extended.
As freed black slaves joined the polity over the bitter and violent objections
of their former owners, the self-defense aspect of the Second Amendment
was of paramount importance. Sally Hemings needed the means to defend
herself from unwanted intrusions upon her integrity. That is what the Recon-
struction Congresses recognized. It was not so much a reconception of the
right to arms as it was a reinvigoration of a preexisting purpose. Until then,
nobody had systematically attempted to disarm an entire discrete portion of
the polity in order to deprive them of the means of self-defense. When the
attempt occurred, the self-defense strand of the arms right was championed
vigorously.
Yet in United States v. Cruikshank,52 the Supreme Court vitiated much
of the power of the federal legislation rooted in the conception of the right to
bear arms as securing a right to personal defense.' In the aftermath of an
1872 Louisiana race riot, Cruikshank, a Klan member, was convicted of
conspiring to deprive black citizens of their federal constitutional rights of
peaceable assembly and bearing arms." The Court overturned Cmikshank's
conviction and held the federal statute unconstitutional as beyond the scope
of congressional power. 55 The Court reasoned that congressional power to
enforce the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized
Congress to protect the assembly or arms rights only if those rights were
149. See AMAR, supra note 148, at 257-66.
150. See id.
151. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (exploring constitutions of Pennsylva-
nia and Vermont).
152. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
153. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,548 (1875) (holding certain gun control
legislation to be beyond federal power).
154. Id. at 544-55; see also 16 Stat. 140, § 6 (1870), codified today at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-
242.
155. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 559.
1120
GUNS, EXTREMSTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
"privileges and immunities" of federal citizenship." 6 Applying the logic of
The Slaughter-House Cases"5 7 that the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship did not include the rights secured by the Bill of Rights,"58 the Court
concluded that the assembly and arms rights were not "granted or created" by
the Constitution.!59 They were natural rights that existed prior to constitu-
tional government; all the Constitution did was recognize these rights as
incapable of infingement by the federal government, but it neither created
nor granted them.." Moreover, even if the right to bear arms was created by
the Constitution and enforceable against the states, Congress lacked any
authority to prohibit invasions of that right by private citizens."" Thus, the
Court in Cruikshank did not repudiate the idea that the arms right protected
individual self-defense, but it did virtually eliminate the utility of that right as
against invasion by states or private citizens. Indeed, by tying the source of
the arms right to natural entitlements and by suggesting that an aggrieved
citizen seek recourse from his state, the Cruikshank Court implicitly endorsed
the idea that the arms right encompasses an individual right. Whatever a
natural right may be, it is surely something possessed by individuals and not
the product of government. The right of a government to maintain a militia
is hardly natural. Moreover, if the arms right was purely a collective right of
the state, it would make no sense for the Court to observe that the "people['s]"
remedy for its "violation by their fellow-citizens" is to call upon their state
governments.
162
156. Id. at 551-54.
157. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
158. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (holding that
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Fourteenth Amendment is not shorthand for first eight
amendments to Constitution).
159. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,551(1875).
160. See id. The Court stated:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long
before the adoption of the Constitution .... It is found wherever civilization
exists. It was not, therefore, a right granted to the people by the Constitution ....
The right.., of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose" ... is not a right granted by
the Constitution [nor] dependent on that instrument for its existence. The second
amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this [ means] that it shall not
be infringed by Congress,] ... leaving the people to look to [their state govern-
ments] for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights
it recognizes.
Id. at 551-53.
161. Id. at 553.
162. Id.
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The other Supreme Court decision of the nineteenth century dealing with
the Second Amendment is Presser v. Illinois,63 in which the Court upheld the
validity of an Illinois statute prohibiting private militias, as applied to an
organized group of armed laborers who publicly marched in a paramilitary
assembly." The Court had no difficulty agreeing that the arms right does not
include the right to parade about in concert with others brandishing arms.
65
In any case, said the Court, the Second Amendment right does not apply to the
states.' Presser does not add muchto our understanding of whether the arms
right includes an individual right to self-defense because that issue was simply
not considered. The case does, however, strongly suggest that the collective
right of self-defense is one that can and should be regulated by the states.
Presser leaves no doubt that the Second Amendment would not be offended
were a state to outlaw the various insurrectionist militias that are lesions on
the contemporary body politic.
United States v. Miller,167 the only twentieth century United States
Supreme Court decision on the Second Amendment, provides grist to both
ideological mills and settles nothing." The Court sustained the validity of a
provision in the National Firearms Act that made it a crime to transport a
sawed-off shotgun across state lines, opining that the Second Amendment was
intended to insure that the nation was capable of defense by citizen-soldiers
and reflected the founding generation's distrust of a standing army.169 By
itself, this suggests that the Court in Miller saw the arms right as entirely
collective, and that is the spin collective rights theorists give Miller. But the
Court also stated that in the absence of proof that a sawed-off shotgun "has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
lated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right
to keep and bear such an instrument."'7 0 The clear implication of the Court
was that there might be a private right to possess and to use weapons that are
"part of the ordinary military equipment or [which] could contribute to the
common defense."" 1 This is, of course, highly unsettling to the ideologues of
163. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
164. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,269 (1886) (finding that Illinois statute prohibit-
ing private militias was constitutional).
165. Id. at267.
166. Id. at266-68.
167. 307U.S. 174 (1939).
168. See United States v. IMller, 307 U.S. 174,178 (1939) (finding National Firearms Act
constitutional).
169. Id. at 179.
170. Id. at 178.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
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gun control because it plainly suggests a heightened constitutional interest in
private possession of modem infantry weapons: fully automatic small caliber
rifles and carbines with high capacity magazines. As almost everyone knows,
these weapons are the particular bete noire ofthe gun control enthusiasts. The
Miller Court may have endorsed the collective defense purpose of the Second
Amendment but it surely did not repudiate the idea of an individual right to
further that common defense. The Court's language surely indicates that the
individual right is broader than a mere "right" to be conscripted into military
service. Perhaps the Miller Court meant to drive out of the Second Amend-
ment any individual right to possess arms for self-defense, but the Court
hardly said so.
None of the text, original intent, historical practice, constitutional struc-
ture, or doctrine provides a definitive answer to the question of whether the
arms right includes an individual right to keep and to use arms in self-defense.
We are forced to decide for ourselves. Fortunately, we are not left completely
bereft by the traditional sources of constitutional understanding.
Let us begin with a principle that all sides can agree upon: The Second
Amendment was intended, at least in part, to insure that a large, relatively
unselect body of the polity possess arms and hold them in readiness for the
defense of the nation. We may debate whether this was due to distrust of a
standing army, a device to insure that states had power to put down local
insurrections, or provision of a means to resist tyranny from within or without,
but there can be little argument that the aspiration was for a broad cadre of
citizen-soldiers ("civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion," inthe words of the
Miller Court') available to defend the community. Of course, the Second
Amendment has failed to vindicate this purpose. The standing army is a
fixture and has been for a very long time. The militia as a uniquely anti-
insurrectionist arm of state governments is an anachronism. Almost nobody
believes that the citizenry is constitutionally entitled to resist governmental
tyranny by force of arms. The insurrectionist view of the arms right receives
little support and we may safely discount it. There maybe a "right" to revolu-
tion, but it is not constitutionally recognized. Yet, when constitutional pro-
visions fail in their essential purpose, it is proper to apply a doctrine I have
previously described as "constitutional Qy pres."'173 We should attempt to
construe the failed provision in ways, even unintended and unorthodox ways,
that will deliver as much of its essential purpose as can be provided within the
context ofthe present constitutional structure." 4 Ofcourse, this often requires
172. Id. at 179.
173. CALVNR.MASSEY, SILENTRIGHrS: TBENnTaAMENDMENT AND THE CONSlnru-
ITON's UNTHEu m ID GUrs 97-115 (1995).
174. See kaL at 99. The "incorporation" doctrine reflects a form of constitutional cy pres
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recasting the original intentions that have failed into a more general formula-
tion, but this is neither new nor unprincipled. 75 So long as the more general
formulation is faithfii to the specific intent that can no longer be accom-
plished, no violence is done to original intentions, even assuming the highly
debatable premise that original intent is the lodestar of constitutional interpre-
tation.
The undeniable theme of the arms right is defense - collective and
individual. Collective defense is the melody of the theme, but the repeated
sound of individual defense is the harmony. The arms right is not just about
the right to die in uniform; it is about defending ourselves, our loved ones, our
community, our nation, from those who would harm what we value. Not only
is there evidence, albeit contested, that a personal self-defense right was part
of the original specific intent of the Second Amendment's framers, and
additional evidence that a considerable portion of the polity gave it that
construction over the ensuing century or so, the personal self-defense interpre-
tation comports with the slightly more general intent of defense. Our nation
is no longer defended by citizen-soldiers. We are not Switzerland, where an
armed cadre of citizen-soldiers continues to form the core ofnational defense.
Ambient circumstances have changed; the "common defense" purpose of the
Second Amendment has shriveled into a useless raisin. Butthe need to defend
against ordinary criminality is, unfortunately, still with us, and the right to
defend against criminal assault is surely not useless.
Advocates of gun control ought not bridle at this conclusion. One of the
reasons why the gun debate is so polarized is because many gun owners
simply do not believe the disclaimers of gun controllers that they do not intend
to confiscate all private firearms. Indeed, the currently fashionable trend to
describe firearms as a public health problem, as if guns were a pathogenic
organism like smallpox virus, exacerbates this fear because the logical re-
sponse to equating guns to smallpox is to eradicate the noxious pathogen." 6
Because gun owners do not believe that gun controllers will be content with
any control scheme short of abolition of private possession of firearms, they
tend to overinflate their claim of constitutional entitlement. The result is a
after the federal Bill of Rights was drummed out of the pantheon of the privileges and immuni-
ties of U.S. citizens. Id. The grafting of a general principle of state sovereign immunity onto
the Eleventh Amendment is another example. Id. at 100-02.
175. This is what the Court did in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
when it applied a more general principle of equal protection than the framers of the Equal
Protection Clause specifically intended. See MASSEY, supra note 173, at 102-04.
176. See, e.g., C. Everett Koop & George D. Lundberg, Violence in America: A Public
Health Emergency, 267 JAMA 3075, 3075 (1992) (arguing for restrictions on firearm posses-
sion because firearms pose public health problem).
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"debate" that is an angry shouting match from very long distance. Admitting
that the arms right includes a private right to possess firearms for individual
self-defense provides some measure of comfort to gun owners and simulta-
neously denies the grossly inflated claim that firearms ownership is an abso-
lute right or that it includes the right to pack a Ryder truck full of ammonia
fertilizer and diesel oil and detonate the package in front of a federal office
building. Of course, this will not satisfy either the hard-core abolitionists or
the fanatic insurrectionists, but I am not interested in an interpretation of
constitutional law that panders to extremists and lunatics. The real issues that
the gun debate ought to revolve around are the extent of permissible regula-
tion of firearms acquisition, ownership, possession, and use in light of a
recognized, legitimate entitlement to possess and to use firearms in self-
defense.
. The Scope of an Individual Right to Armed Self-Defense
Once a right to keep arms for purposes of self-defense is recognized, the
focus shifts to the standard of review that courts should employ in testing
claims of governmental infringement of that right. In this Part, I will first
examine that question and then turn to the logically subsequent question of
whether such a Second Amendment right, complete with the standard of
review I propose, should be applied to the states via the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is axiomatic that government action is presumptivly valid unless some
indicator of invalidity is present, thus shifting the burden to the government
to justify the validity of its action by proving that its challenged action con-
forms to the level of scrutiny that the Court has identified as appropriate.
What should indicate when a governmental firearms regulation becomes a
presumptive violation ofthe right to keep arms for self-defense? The right is
not an absolute; almost no constitutional right is absolutely inviolate. The
history offirearms regulation before and after adoption ofthe Second Amend-
ment is a thorough demonstration that the Second Amendment has never been
thought to bestow absolute entitlements. 177 The doctrinal history of the arms
right, whether in its Second Amendment or state constitutional form, reveals
a tradition of sustaining restrictions upon the keeping and bearing of arms, so
long as those restrictions do not materially encumber or frustrate absolutely
the core purposes of the right."' Moreover, given the contested history of a
177. See supra notes 49-101 and accompanying text (discussing historical restrictions on
right to bear arms).
178. See supra notes 49-101 and accompanying text (discussing historical restrictions on
tight to bear arms).
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Second Amendment individual right to arms for self-defense, it would be
manifest error to treat such a right as absolute. The indicator of presumptive
invalidity, then, should be a conclusion that the challenged regulation materi-
ally inffinges upon the individual right to arms for self-defense.
What constitutes a material infringement? One way of answering the
question is to describe some categories of regulations that surely are not
material infringements. Regulations that deprive people who lack lawful
capacity of the right to wield arms in self-defense are surely immaterial
restrictions, if they even constitute restrictions at all. Such people include
minors and the insane. A similar category consists of those people who are
a proven threat to public safety - convicted criminals or people with a proven
violent disposition. In addition to categories of people, restrictions upon cate-
gories of weapons might also be immaterial, depending on the specific cate-
gory prohibited or restricted. For example, a ban on handguns equipped with
silencers is surely not a material infringement. Muffled weaponry is not
essential or even very useful to effective self-defense. A ban on private pos-
session of military grenade launchers is also surely permissible. The occa-
sions in which such a weapon would be a useful tool of self-defense are surely
so few, and the risk of collateral property damage and personal injury result-
ing from its use is so large, that is hard to imagine that such a restriction could
be seen as a material impairment upon the individual right of armed self-
defense. It need hardly be added, I suppose, that bans or severe restrictions
on private possession of weapons of mass destruction, bombs, tanks, artillery,
rockets, and the like are easy cases that need not be discussed.
Prohibition of private possession of fully automatic weapons is also
surely a non-material restriction. A fully automatic weapon causes rapid,
continuous fire so long as the trigger remains depressed and rounds remain in
the magazine. The rate of fire for a modern military-issue fully automatic
infantry rifle is in the neighborhood of 700 rounds per minute, or slightly
more than eleven bulletsper second."9 Such weapons cannot sustain that rate
of fire for any appreciable amount of time; they are constrained by magazine
capacity (30 to 100 rounds), so these weapons provide a burst of about three
to eight seconds of potential death before they must be reloaded by insertion
of a new magazine. But even eight seconds of automatic fire will spew 100
slugs into the air at very high velocity, with attendant risk of considerable
179. The rate of fire for the M-14, the predecessor to the standard American military
assault rifle, the M16, is 750 rounds per minute. See http'//www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Camp/
2781/M14.htm. The rate of fire for the AK-47, the standard Soviet bloc assault weapon since
1949, is 600 rounds per minute. See Kalashnikov Arms Catalog, AK-47AssaultRifle, at http'/J
kalashnikov.guns.ru/model/kaSO.html.
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collateral damage. An individual right to armed self-defense does not mean
the right to overwhelming firepower in self-defense, regardless of collateral
consequences. Indeed, one measure of the boundary of the right might be the
criminal law's limits on a deadly response in self-defense. Under the criminal
law it might be justifiable to kill your attacker, but the justification would not
excuse you from responsibility for the deaths of two or three bystanders
shredded by errant rounds from your fully automatic rifle. It seems perverse
to read the individual right to armed self-defense as securing the right to act
beyond the limits ofjustifiable self-defense.
Absolute prohibitions upon private possession of handguns, shotguns,
and rifles might well be material ifringements. The answer depends upon the
utility of the weapon in question. Handguns are particularly effective for self-
defense; that is one reason police officers walk around with them instead of
sawed-off shotguns. Moreover, the risk of collateral damage is minimized if
the weapon is not fully automatic. Shotguns and rifles are less utile in self-
defense, but to a person confronted with two or three armed thugs in his front
hall a shotgun with an eighteen-inch barrel length is a very effective weapon
with which to quell the imminent peril.
The hardest category to deal with is the semi-automatic rifle or handgun.
A semi-automatic weapon fires repeatedly as quickly as the trigger is pulled
after release from the prior shot. Essentially, a semi-automatic weapon can
be fired as rapidly as the shooter can move his or her finger, producing an
effective rate of fire of about two or three rounds per second. This is substan-
tially less than the rate of fire produced by fully automatic weapons but is still
rapid. The risk of collateral damage is lower than with an automatic weapon
but is still high, especially since fear and panic often accompany shootings in
self-defense. 80 This case ought to be resolved by application of a general
principle applicable to the question of when gun regulations materially impair
the individual right of armed self-defense: If the regulation permits reason-
able access to and use of firearms that are both suited to-self-defense and that
180. See, e.g., Jane Fritsch, Offcer Recounts Diallo's Shooting in Day on Stand, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 15, 2000, at Al, B3 (providing testimony of New York police officers accused of
murder in death ofAmadou Diallo). Thinking Diallo was engaged in criminal activity, two plain
clothed officers approached Diallo in the vestibule of an apartment building, displayed badges,
asked to speak to him, then asked him to display his hands openly. M-1 As Diallo pulled an
object from his pocket, one of the officers shouted that it was a gun. His partner leaped back-
ward and fell, causing the first officer to think that Diallo had shot his partner. Id. Shooting
ensued. Id. One of two other officers who rushed to the scene and shot at Diallo testified that
he saw the first officer that fired "in a panicked state, scrambling down the stairs and shooting."
Id. Another officer testified that after the shooting he thought "I was going into shock... I
didn't know where I was." Jane Fritsch, Two OfficersBackStory ofPartners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb
16,2000, atBi, B6.
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do not have an inherent high risk of collateral damage, the regulation does not
materially impair the individual right of armed self-defense.
By this standard, most regulations that are short of absolute prohibitions
will likely be found not to be material infringements. Limitations on the
number of guns that may be purchased are unlikely to be material infringe-
ments. Requirements that guns be equipped with trigger locks or, if technol-
ogy permits, an individual user identification system that will disable the
firing mechanism except in the hands of the authenticated user, are unlikely
to constitute material infringements.
Problems arise when considering licensing systems. These may take
several forms but, for illustration, consider two types of licensing: (1) restrict-
ing access to guns only to licensed gun owners and operators and (2) restrict-
ing the carrying of a gun concealed on one's person to those licensed for the
practice. The materiality of the infringement produced by licensing depends
upon the standards employed to limit the discretion of the licensing authority.
The proper analogy is to the branch-of the law of prior restraints that governs
speech licensing schemes.' Speech licensing schemes that confer unfettered
discretion on a governmental official to permit or deny speech are presump-
tively void," while licensing schemes that contain clear standards limiting the
denial of licenses to circumstances where the speech could be validly pun-
ished after the fact are facially valid, though still subject to constitutional
challenge based on application."r The same principle ought to apply to
Second Amendment rights. A licensing scheme for possession of firearms
suitable for personal self-defense should be presumptively void if it vests
unconstrained discretion in the licensing authority to grant or deny such
licenses. But a licensing system that limits such official discretion by specify-
ing criteria for a license that would be independently valid ought not be
subjected to any greater scrutiny because a license is a prerequisite to lawful
gun possession. Thus, a system that restricts firearms licenses to sane, law-
abiding adults who have completed a reasonable course in firearms handling
181. For a general exploration of the meaning of the Second Amendment by reference to
the First Amendment's speech jurisprudence, see L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitu-
tionalInterpretation, 38 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1311 (1997).
182. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123,136-37 (1992)
(finding ordinance did not have constitutionally required standards to guide administrator in
setting permit fee); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988)
(holding portions of ordinance giving mayor nearly complete discretion to deny permit applica-
tion unconstitutional); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (striking down
municipal ordinance that restricted press and free speech).
183. See, e.g., Coxv. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,577(1941) (deciding that law requir-
ing license for parade was constitutional as applied to group of Jehovah's Witnesses).
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and safety should be presumptively valid and would not likely constitute a
material infringement of the individual right to armed self-defense.
Licensing schemes designed to limit the number of people entitled law-
fully to carry a concealed weapon pose slightly different problems. Schemes
that vest uncontrolled discretion in government officials to grant or deny such
permits should be presumptively invalid. Licensing laws that cabin official
discretion by directing issuance of "concealed carry" permits only to those
persons who have demonstrated some special or exceptional need for personal
armed self-defense should also be treated as presumptively invalid. Such laws
materially infinge the individual right to armed self-defense because they
disable ordinary citizens from exercising their own judgment concerning the
necessity of preparations for armed self-defense. Under these laws, citizens
must justify their exceptional need for armed self-defense before being
allowed to carry a concealed firearm. Reading the Second Amendment to
include an individual right to armed self-defense reverses that burden; it is the
government that must justify a wholesale bar to the means of armed self-
defense in public, the place where it might most be needed. This is not to say
that such statutes can never be justified, but it is to say that the government
must bear the burden of their justification under heightened scrutiny.
To what level of heightened scrutiny should gun regulations that materi-
ally infringe the individual right of armed self-defense be subjected? There
are three possibilities. The tiered-scrutiny approach would offer either strict
or intermediate scrutiny. The flexible "sliding-scale" approach to equal pro-
tection championed by such Justices as Thurgood Marshall and John Paul
Stevens would employ a factor-based balancing approach.
Tiered scrutiny is familiar and accepted. It offers the benefit of settled
nomenclature if not necessarily settled results. But tiered scrutiny in either
form would permit clandestine balancing to occur in the identification of
whether or not a given regulation materially infringes the individual right of
armed self-defense. This problem would likely be exacerbated if strict scru-
tiny were selected as the operative standard. While judicial manipulation of
the material infiingement trigger for heightened scrutiny would likely be
reduced with intermediate scrutiny, that would probably occur only because
the "substantially related" and "important interest" elements of intermediate
scrutiny are themselves extremely indeterminate. But we live with these
defects in other, and arguably more important areas of our constitutional law
so there is no reason to think we could not construct a serious Second Amend-
ment jurisprudence in a reasonably principled fashion.
Strict scrutiny places a very high constitutional value on the individ-
ual right of armed self-defense and a correspondingly high burden ofjustifi-
1129
57 WAS. &LEE L. REV 1095 (2000)
cation upon the government when it acts to infringe that right materially.
There is no generally accepted and fully coherent theory of why we treat
certain constitutional rights as exceptionally valuable, and thus subject gov-
ernmental infringements of them to strict scrutiny, other constitutional rights
as possessing "ordinary" high value, and thus subject governmental infringe-
ments to intermediate scrutiny, and still other constitutional rights as possess-
ing no unusual value, and thus subject governmental inffingements to some
form of minimal scrutiny. In short, nobody has ever adequately and convinc-
ingly explained generally why the right to speak without governmental regu-
lation of the content of the speech is so valuable that government infringe-
ments are subject to strict scrutiny, but the right to be free of governmental
sex discrimination is so much less valuable that governmental infringements
are justifiable under intermediate scrutiny, and the right to receive compensa-
tion for governmental regulations of property that devastate the economic
value of that property is non-existent so long as the regulations are reason-
ably related to some legitimate governmental purpose. But some explanation
is surely necessary before we place the hitherto unrecognized right to armed
self-defense in the most revered niche in the pantheon of constitutional
liberties.
A common justification of the necessity of the government affording to
citizens the right to assert acts of self-defense as a defense to otherwise
criminal acts is the idea that there is a moral entitlement to such action and
that, consequently, the government must observe and respect this moral
entitlement. 8 4 Claire Oakes Finkelstein has cogently criticized this claim,
concluding that justification "of the State's obligation to extend a right of self-
defense to its citizens must be sought not in moral philosophy, but in the
substantive political considerations that establish state legitimacy." 8 5 The
political considerations that argue for state respect of a right to armed self-
defense as an obligation of the highest order are weaker than the moral
arguments. Opponents of recognizing any individual right of armed self-
defense typically claim that any increase in public access to firearms produces
higher dangers for the public as a whole. But the weight of the empirical
evidence supports the intuitively non-obvious claim that increased access to
184. For a general statement of the theme that moral rights necessarily obligate govern-
ments to respect them by non-intrference, see RONALD DWORKUN, TAKING RIGHrS SERIOUSLY
184-91 (1977). For specific applications of the principle to self-defense, see ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34-35 (1974); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. &
PUB. AIF. 283 (1991); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, in RIGHTS, RESTITU-
TION, AND RISK 33 (William Parent ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
185. Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of Self-
Defense to its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1361,1364-65 (1999).
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firearms for self-defense purposes actually reduces crime and attendant public
danger. 86 This is suggested to be due to the deterrent effect on criminals, who
face a higher risk that their chosen victim may be armed and, thus, not easy
prey. Perhaps as compared to a state in which no private firearms exist, the
presence of private anms for self-defense would increase public danger, but in
the highly imperfect society in which we actually live there is no credible
evidence that increased access to firearms for self-defense purposes truly
increases public danger."n The question of whether or not strict scrutiny is
appropriate should not, of course, be determined by reference solely to our
understanding of the effect of armed self-defense on crime and other public
dangers, but those effects should be considered.
The strongest arguments for strict scrutiny are two historical facts. First,
the eighteenth century founders generally agreed that the point of the Second
Amendment was to secure the means of defense. Plenty of differences existed
on important details - whether the defense right was limited to common
defense or included individual defense, whether the right was for defense
against domestic tyranny or only external aggression, whether the right was
possessed by individuals or only states - but there was consensus thatthe right
was all about defense.s Second, the Reconstruction framers were definitely
of the opinion that the Second Amendment included an individual right to
possess arms for self-defense.' While they did not propose or adopt the
Second Amendment, their understanding of its content at a time of crucial
constitutional rearrangement ought to be given considerable respect. Of
186. See generaly Lott, supra note 1 (arguing that private gun ownership reduces crime).
187. For a critical discussion of this literature, focusing on the claimed scientific shortcom-
ings of the studies purporting to show increased risk, see GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK. GUNS
AND VIOLENCE INAMERICA (Michael Useem & James D. Wright eds.,Aldine de Gruyter 1991);
Edgar A. Suter, Guns in the Medical Literature -A Failure ofPeer Review, 83 . MED. ASs'N
GA. 133 (1994).
188. Garry Wills stands out as a leading dissenter from this contention. Wills has made
the astonishing claim that the Second Amendment added nothing to the Constitution and the
even more unbelievable claim that Madison urged its adoption simply to hoodwink the Anti-
Federalists into thinking that something was added to the Constitution. Garry Wills, To Keep
andBearArms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept 21, 1995, at 62,72. Even in an agewithoutideals, the
stark cynicism of Wills's position is remarkable. Wills asks us to believe that Madison's public
statements were calculated lies offered up only for their political appeal. But Madison's private
writings suggest that he was always earnest in his stewardship of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g.,
Powe, supra note 181, at 1359-65 (examining Wills's conclusions in light of historical evidence
of Madison's intentions). Despite Wlls's reputation as a fine scholar, his reading of Madison's
motives is simply wrong.
189. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting support for contention that founding
generation was in agreement that individual right to possess arms existed).
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course, we are not bound by the past, but because "it is a constitution we are
expounding"''1 we ought to adopt current interpretations that at least connect
with the past, even if they do not exhibit slavish devotion to past views. If the
weight of historical opinion favors recognition of an individual right of self-
defense it ought to be given respect in our doctrinal taxonomy.
Finally, whatever skepticism may exist concerning the connection be-
tween generally accepted moral rights and the obligations of governments to
respect those moral rights," the fact is that our constitutional tradition has
long accepted this connection. From the Declaration of Independence to
Calder v. BullP to the Ninth Amendment to the confirmation hearings of
Robert Bork and Justice Clarence Thomas, American constitutional law has
always had a "natural law" element to it, reflected today in the set of con-
stitutionally unenumerated rights that coalesce under the rubric of "flmda-
mental rights" for purposes of equal protection and due process. If anything,
the individual right to armed self-defense has a better textual foundation in
the Second Amendment than these other rights, infringements of which
require governmental justification under the demanding standard of strict
scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny, though famously claimed by Gerald Gunther to be
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact,"'1 might not always be fatal to govern-
mental regulations materially infringing upon the Second Amendment right.
The government's compelling purpose will typically be some variation on
the theme of public safety - prevention of the death of or injury to innocent
people. Surely this is a compelling interest. What could be of much higher
priority? The degree of connection between this laudable objective and
the means chosen to achieve it would likely prove to be the litigation battle-
ground.
The government ought not be required to prove that its choice of means
is the least restrictive alternative available to it. The individual right to armed
self-defense is not an absolute right; carefully calibrated infringements that do
in fact substantially increase public safety should be constitutionally accept-
able. The government should be required to prove that its chosen means, in
purpose and in fact, substantially advance the government's compelling objec-
tive. So, for example, ifthe government think that the canying of concealed
weapons by law-abiding people poses an unacceptable danger to public safety
190. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,407 (1819).
191. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 185 (criticizing moral entitlement argument).
192. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
193. Gerald Gunther, Foreword In Search ofEvolvingDocrine on a Changing Court:
A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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and acts to ban the practice by private citizens, it will be required to justify its
material infi-ngement of the Second Amendment right of armed self-defense
by showing that the ban "substantially advances" the government's compelling
objective.
Critics will observe that this would have the effect of making the courts
the arbiters ofthe validity of the conflicting empirical evidence on this point.
That is likely correct, but I am not convinced that is so bad. I see no reason
why legislators possess any greater competence than judges to evaluate this
evidence. Indeed, because legislators may be more prone than judges to
ignore the constitutional rights of minorities (here, law-abiding citizens so
fearful of criminal attack that they wish to carry a lethal weapon around with
them) it makes sense to me to vest this power with the judiciary, the body that
we have entrusted for over two centuries with primary responsibility for
preservation of our constitutional liberties.
Even if an individual right to armed self-defense is recognized and
accorded the "semi-strict" scrutiny I propose, the question remains whether it
should be enforced only against the federal government or whether it should
be made applicable to the states by judicial incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. As a normative proposition there is much
to be said for wholesale incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but that was an earlier genera-
tion's argument,'94 and I shall not repeat it here. There is also much to be said
for a revival of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities
Clause, surely a more textually convenient vessel into which to pour the Bill
of Rights. While an even earlier generation seemed to deflate the Privileges
and Immunities Clause entirely, 9 ' and our generation may be pumping some
constitutional air back into it,'96 I prefer not to enter that speculative thicket
and to concentrate instead upon the accepted mechanism for retail incorpora-
tion of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.
194. Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, I., dissenting)
(arguing that one of Fourteenth Amendment's chief objectives was to make Bill of Rights
applicable to states) with Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of'Rights? The Oiginal Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 134-39 (1949) (arguing that
history does not support contention that Bill of Rights was intended to be applied to states
through Fourteenth Amendment).
195. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (finding that Congress
could only protect arms right if it was privilege and immunity of United States citizenship); The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (eliminating Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause as basis for incorporating Bill of Rights against states).
196. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,510-11 (1999) (resting right of interstate migration
upon Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause).
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Most of the incorporation jurisprudence has involved the procedural
rights guaranteed to criminal defendants. In that context, the question is
whether the right sought to be incorporated is "fundamental to the American
scheme ofjustice."'" The Court's approach to determining whether a claimed
right is constitutionally fundamental for purposes of assimilation into the
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence focuses on whether the right,
"carefully" described so as to be no broader than the facts of the case
require, 1 is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."" Taken together, this directs us to undertake an
historical examination of the place of an individual right of armed self-de-
fense. As earlier discussed, the individual right of armed self-defense has
never been unqualified and largely has been limited to those who constitute
the voting polity. But as the Reconstruction demonstrates, as the polity
expands the individual right to armed self-defense has been expanded simi-
larly. Indeed, the Reconstruction experience is especially relevant because the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause owes its life to Reconstruction
politics. If there is one thing that is clear about the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment it is that they were determined to endow newly freed black
Americans with all the rights their fellow Americans of white skin enjoyed.
One of the most important of those rights, especially given the climate of
violence endemic to the South at the time, was the right to arm oneself to repel
criminal assault. The fact that some limitations on this right were approved
by antebellum state courts does not destroy the historical pedigree ofthe right,
but it does confirm that when the government interest is sufficiently compel-
ling and the government's chosen infringing means are closely connected to
the compelling end, the individual right may be trumped by public necessity.
It may be that the "gun culture"of America is largely a nineteenth century
construct, as Michael Bellesiles argues, 2" although that is a contested histori-
cal perception, but the fact is that for a very long period of time, and certainly
by 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, we have been a
nation that has generally accepted an informal "right" to arm oneself for
purposes of self-protection. The Court's incorporation doctrine requires that
arguments for and against incorporation be based on appeals to history. The
arguments for incorporation are strong, and the Second Amendment right of
197. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,150 (1968).
198. See Washington v. Olucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,735-36 (1997) (holding that prohibition
against aiding suicide does not violate Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
199. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97,105 (1934)).
200. Bellesiles, Origins, supra note 1, at 425.
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individual armed self-defense ought to be incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."°
HT. Conclusion
Partisan interpreters ofthe Second Amendment tend to allow their policy
preferences to color their judgments oftex history, structure, and the meager
doctrine that has accreted to the Second Amendment. Those who abhor
firearms and blame them for much ofthe violence that afflicts our society tend
to cling to the "collective rights" explanation ofthe Second Amendment - the
idea that it protects only the states' right to organize and to equip a militia
composed of the people, subject to federal control exerted under authority
provided in Article I. Those who value firearms tend to offer one or more of
several versions of an "individual rights" explanation of the Second Amend-
ment: The arms right, they say, protects an individual and collective right
(1) to resist governmental tyranny, (2) to resist external armed threats to the
community, and an individual right (3) to resist private criminal aggression
and (4) to possess weapons for sporting or other lawful purposes unconnected
to defense. Much has been written, perhaps too much, about the historical
record that supports either side ofthe debate, and in this Article I have merely
summarized some of the salient features of the debate.
In my view, each side of this debate is partly right and partly wrong. The
arms right was conceived in response to multiple and partially conflicting
concerns. Some Americans wished to blunt the possibility of a federal stand-
ing army by confirming the right of the people to organize themselves, under
the auspices of their state governments, into a militia that could defend the
nation when necessary. Some Americans wished to be sure that the states
would possess an armed force capable of suppressing domestic insurrections
like Shays's Rebellion or slave revolts. A very few radicals wished to insure
that a right of armed resistance to one's own government was preserved,
though these people were always marginal players in the debate. Some
Americans wished to preserve the people's right to hold arms both for the
common defense and for self-defense. Some Americans, remembering the
game laws of England that disarmed the yeomanry to prevent poaching the
gentry's game, wanted to protect the people's right to hold and to use arms for
purposes of hunting. These groups were not mutually exclusive and very few
of these interests are mutually antagonistic.
201. For an explicit argument to this effect, see Karen Wai Wong-Ervin, Note, The Second
Amendment and the Incorporation Conundrum: Towards a Workable Jurisprudence, 50
HASTNGS LJ. 177,199-213 (1998).
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To understand the history at all, one must superimpose what early Ameri-
cans actually did upon this background of theoretical purposes. The militia
was ifi-organized and poorly equipped until the volcanic convulsion of arms
of the Civil War. The militia was always defined as composing the entirety
of the adult, but not superannuated, able-bodied men of the polity, although
the actual composition of the militia was of a much smaller fragment of
the polity. Despite the supposed obligation of militia service, many men
shirked the duty. Most if not all states limited firearms possession to those
who were bona fide members of the polity, specifically excluding Indians,
blacks, criminals, and traitors. But at the same time many states recognized
in their own constitutions an individual right to keep arms for self-defense.
During this same antebellum period the prevalence of private arms increased;
the "gun culture" of America emerged. As states sought to prevent private
duels and resolution of private quarrels by resort to arms, they enacted laws
prohibiting the carrying of certain concealed weapons, often derringers and
Bowie knives. These laws typically were upheld in opinions that made clear
that, while there existed an individual right to arms possession, the right was
not absolute and could be curtailed when the public interest was sufficiently
strong.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress left
excellent evidence of its intention to secure to newly freed blacks all the rights
previously enjoyed by white Americans. One ofthose rights was the individ-
ual right of armed self-defense, a particularly important right in the climate of
racial violence that was endemic to the defeated Confederacy. The Fourteenth
Amendment, created by these same politicians, was part of this general
program of protection of the rights of individuals at the expense of state
power. Although the full promise of the Fourteenth Amendment was initially
hobbled by the Court's restrictive reading ofthe Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause, and that reading left its imprint on the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Second Amendment in United States v. Cruikshank and Presser v.
Illinois, the Court has never squarely rejected an individual rights reading of
the Second Amendment. 2
In light of these mixed indicators from history, it is appropriate, in my
view, to apply a form of what I have called "constitutional cy pres" to the
Second Amendment.20 3 By raising the level of generality at which we read the
amendment, we can reach agreement that the central focus of the amendment
202. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text (discussing Cruikshank and Presser
decisions).
203. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting author's previous application of
"constitutional cyprem").
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is defense."' The common defense element has atrophied by reason of
ambient cultural change. °s We no longer fear a standing army or, if we do,
we fear the threats augmented by the absence of a standing army even more.
We cannot plausibly argue that the Second Amendment was intended, then or
now, merely to guarantee our right to be conscripted into the armed
services.2"s This being so, the only defense function left for the Second
Amendment to secure is that of individual self-defense. Sadly, this individual
defense element of the Second Amendment has not been shrunk by the ambi-
ent culture.2" To be sure, the perceived necessity of armed self-defense may
actually be increased by the presence of so many firearms in our culture, but
the empirical evidence suggests that in our imperfect society the increased
prevalence of firearms for self-defense actually reduces crime.2"
Reading the Second Amendment as securing an individual right to self-
defense does not mean that this right is absolute. In my view, only material
infringements of the right ought to trigger the presumption of invalidity that
places on the government the burden of justifying the infingement. Many
forms of gun regulation or prohibition would likely not constitute material
infringements. When a material infringement is established, the government
should be required to justify its infringement by proving that the infringing
regulation, in purpose and effect, is substantially related to the achievement
of a compelling objective. This hybrid form of heightened scrutiny, "semi-
strict" scrutiny, if you will, would protect the individual right of armed self-
defense while still allowing the state a reasonable and practical opportunity
to curtail arms possession when there is clear public necessity for doing so.
The occasions for finding such public necessity present may be more frequent
than gun enthusiasts would prefer, or they may be less frequent than gun
opponents would prefer. That is a battle left for elsewhere.
A possible unintended benefit of this approach is that it might lessen the
antagonism ofthe gun debate. In their fear that gun regulators are all secretly
bent upon gun confiscation, gun enthusiasts often gravitate toward absurdly
strong claims of firearms entitlement and adamant opposition to even sensible,
204. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (discussing more general formulation
with defense as theme of arms right).
205. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (noting change in popular view of
Second Amendment).
206. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (stating arms right is not just about
right to die in uniform).
207. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (noting need to defend against ordi-
nary criminality).
208. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying txt (discussing whether access to firearms
for self-defense purposes reduces crime).
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and, in my view, constitutionally permissible fireanns regulations. By recog-
nizing that there is a constitutional right to individual ownership of firearms
some of this fear, which may or may not be irrational, will be reduced. Of
course, gun opponents who really do desire the absolute elimination of private
possession of firearms will be utterly dismayed by such a development. I can
only suggest to them that simply because a "right" is constitutionally protected
does not mean that it is a good idea to exercise it. Consider hate speech. We
should all hope for, and work toward, the day when neither hate speech nor
firearms are culturally relevant. In the meantime, we have a Constitution to
tend and respect. Just because the Constitution does not always deliver our
preferred outcome does not mean that we should stop caring for it.
